



LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES ON TttE TAXING POWERS
OF TIlE STATES.
((Concludedfrom p. 638.)
II. Instrumentalities of the United States Government.-The
Federal government is one that within the purview of the powers
granted it by the Constitution, must be supreme, and all state laws
that conflict with the proper exercise of these powers are invalid.
This principle has been applied to the tax laws of the states, where
they affect the instrumentalities which the Federal government
has thought necessary and proper to be used, to carry out the
powers vested in it. The Federal government thought proper to
create a bank with branches in the different states, to be used in
carrying on the fiscal operations of the government. The state of
Maryland required every bank doing business in that state, and
not chartered by the state, either to pay a stamp duty on every
note issued, or pay a tax of $1500 in gross ; certain penalties were
imposed on all the officers of a bank violating the law, and upon
every person who had any agency in circulating such notes. An
action was brought for the penalty, against the officer of a branch
of the Bank of the United States for a violation of this law. It
was held that the law was void, and that the instrumentalities
of the government could not be taxed by the state. MARSHALL,
J.: "The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which
exists Ly its own authority, or is introduced by its permission, but
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it does not extend to those means which are employed by Congres.
to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the peo-
ple of the United States. We think it demonstrable that it does
not. Those powers are not given by the peopie of a singh, state.
They are given by the people of the United States, to a govern-
ment whose laws, made'in pursuance of the Constitution, declared
to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state oannot
confer a sovereignty which will extend over them :" 3le Calloeht v.
State qf iJ1aryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (Cond. U. S. 415-4S1).
It is conceded in this ease that the real property of the bank was
liable to taxation, and the shares of the stockholders in the state
were also liable; those constituted property subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state to be taxed as other property in the state. But the
effect of the law under consideration, was to prohibit the bank from
conducting its business in the state except upon the conditions pre-
scribed by the state. This could not be done, as it would make
the Federal government, in carrying out the powers vested inl it,
dependent upon the states in the selection of its instruments for
the exercise of its powers. In a subsequent case it was urgevd
(Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 860 (Cond. U. S.
278-9)), that this was a private corporation engaged in its own
business, and the casual circumstance of its being employed by the
government in the transaction of its fiscal affairs, should not ex-
empt it from taxation. But the court did not consider it a private
corporation, whose principal object was individual trade and indi-
vidual profit, but as a public corporation. created for public and
national purposes. The principle is applied to a tax on the stock
of the United States imposel by one of the states ; this was said to
be a tax on the power of the goverinent to borrow, and incon-
sistent with the supreme power of that government in exercise of
its vested powers. The exercise of these powers can not be im-
peded, retarded or burdened in any maner whatever ; they are to
be wielded independent of the will of any of the states : J (ston v.
City of Charlcston, 2 Pet. 448-467 (Cond. U. S. 171-175).
Congress, on the 25th of February 1862, passed a law which
provides that " all stocks, bonds and other securities of the United
States, held by individuals, corporations or a sociations within
the Ul.ited States, -hall be exempt flori taxation by or under state
authority." By the laws of the state of New York, in force at
this time, the capital of banks was taxed according to its value
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the Bank of Commerce claimed that so much of its capital as was
invested in stock of the United States was exempt under the Act
of 1862. The Court of Appeals of New York held these stocks
were not exempt: Peop)le v. Com'7m8 of Taxes, 26 N. Y. 165-6.1
The principle involved in the cases alloifing the exemption was, that
to tax such stock was to tax the borrowing power ot the United
States, that such exemption could only affect the borrowing power
where it existed at the time of the loan, so as to influence the
terms and conditions of the loan, to be an inducement to capital-
ists to part with their funds. But here the borrowing power has
been executed, and the exemption ebnfcrs gratuitously upon the
lenders an advantage, not at the expense of the United States, but
at the expense of the states. This case was reversed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States at its December Term 1862,
the court regarding the tax as one upon the borrowing power of
the United States, and equally unconstitutional whether imposed
on the stock co norine, or on the value of the stock as included
in the aggregate of the tax payer's property : Bank of Commerce
v. New York City, 2 Black 620. The principle which formed
the basis of the opinion of the New York court, does not seem to
he noticed, except in reference to the distinction claimed between
the case and that of Wfreston v. Charleston, as to what the court
say, that the question is one of power and not as to the limits of
the exercise of the power; the former is a judicial question, the
latter is not. If it is admitted tnat the power may be exercised
by the states at all, it can not be controlled; and is such an inter-
ference with the power of the Federal government to borrow
money, as is inconsistent with the supreme power vested in that
government by the Constitution : Id. 631-2, 634.
In April 1863, soon after the decision just noticed, the legisla-
ture of New York changed the law as to the taxation of banks,
by which it was in future to be imposed "on a valuation equal to
the amount of their capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in,"
etc. The same.question was raised under this statute as to funds
of the banks invested in United States securities, and the court
held that a tax under this law was tax on the pfoperty of the
I Thik court had previoucly held in P(op'e v. (om".'r q./ Tax s, 23 N. IY. 192,
before tihe psaage of the Act of 1862, 1ihat sch stocks might be taxed by the
state where there was no unfriendly discrimination to the United States as bor-
rowers.
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bank, and that the case could not be distinguished from the former
case. The tax on the capital of a bank is a tax on all the pro-
perty of which it is composed: Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200-209,
December Term 1864.1 And where several persons associated
together and doing business as private bankers, with all their
capital invested in bonds and negotiable securities of the United
States, for the sole purpose of re-selling them at a profit, and re-
purchasing like securities to be sold in the same manner, the
capital being constantly absorbed in some such securities, is not
liable to state or municipal taxation : Chicago v. Lamb, 52 Ill.
414.
Certificates of indebtedness issued for supplies. furnished the
government or certificates given by the treasurer of the United
States to secure a loan of money, stand on the same footing as
bonds or other obligations of the government: The Ban/cs v. TILe
Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; State v ifaig t, 34 N. J. L. (4 Vroom) 128;
so do notes of the United States under the Loan and Currency
Acts of 1862 and 1868, usually known as greenbacks: Bank v.
Supervisors, 7 Wall. 28 ; Hontgomery County v. Blson, 32 Ind.
27; they are issued by the government in the exercise of unques-
tioned powers, which cannot be controlled to any extent by the
states, and are within the enumerated class of securities exempt
by Act of February 25th 1862 from taxation by state authority.
So too it has been held United Revenue Stamps are not taxable
by state authority (Paifrey v. City of Boston, 101 Mass. 329), on
the principle of .ZJcCulloeh v. Haryland. While the courts hold
that any tax on the securities of the United States imposed by the
states is void, and corporations whose funds are so invested are
exempt whenever the tax rests upon the prop erty of the cor-
poration, yet where the tax is imposed on the franchise of the
corporation, is in the form of a bonus paid the state for the privi-
lege of doing business as a corporation, the fact that the funds of
such a corporation are invested in securities of the United States
does not impair the validity of the tax to any extent. The laws
of Connecticut require savings banks to make annual returns to
the comptroller of accounts, "of the total amount of deposits" in
them respectively on the 1st day of July of each year, and to pay
I In P(ople v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., the history of New York legisla-
tion as to banks, and all the cases on the subject, are given.
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annually to the treasurer of tlc state "a sum equal to three-
fourths of one per cent. on the total deposits" in the bank on that
day. One of these banks had, on 1st July 1863, $500,161 of its
deposits invested in securities of the United States, exempt under
Act of 1862, and it claimed that as to that portion of its deposits
the tax was void. But the court held that the tax was not a tax
on property, but a tax on the franchise of the batik and valid :
Society for Sarinqs v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Monroe Savings Bank
v. City of Rochester, 37 N. Y. 365. Shareholder'cannot deduct
from value of share his just debts: People v. Dolan, 86 N. Y. 59.
A statute of Massachusetts requires savings banks to pay to the
commonwealth, on account of its depositors, a tax of one-half of
one per cent. on the amount of its deposits ; to be assessed one-
half on the average amount of its deposits for six months preceding
the 1st of May, and the other half on the average amount of its
deposits for six months preceding 1st of November ; this was held
to be a tax on the franchise of the bank, and not a tax on pro-
perty, anti therefore valid: Provident Ins. v. Massachusetts, 6
Wall. 611. So too a statute requiring corporations haing a capi-
tal stock divided into shares, to pay a tax of one-sixth of one per
cent. upon the excess of the market value of all such stock, over
the value of its real estate and machinery, is a tax on the franchise
of the corporation and not a tax on property, and the funds of
such corporation invested in United States securities are not ex-
empt from state taxation: Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall.
632. But where depositors in savings banks are taxable for their
deposits, the banks are not liable to be taxed on the investment of
the deposits in national bank stock : Augusta Savings Bank v.
Augusta, 56 Maine 176.
(a) National Banks.-Most of the cases in reference to the
taxation of national banks by the states, arise under the Act of
June 1864, which contains this proviso: " That nothing in this
act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of said asso-
ciations, held by any person or body corporate, from being in-
eluded in the valuation of the personal property of such person or
corporation, in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state
authority, at the place where such bank is located and not else-
where, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other
moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state,
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provided that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon
the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act, shall
not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks
organized under authority of the state where such association is
located. Provided also, that nothing in this act shall exempt tl.e
real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal
taxes, to the same extent according to its value, as other real
estate is taxed:" Brightly's Digest 66, 67, § 42. The Act of
1863 contained no such provision. In a case arising under it, it
was said that the states have no power to tax the means and in-
struments employed by the national government in the exercise of
its constitutional functions, and though the state and 'Congress may
exercise a concurrent power of taxation over the same subject-
matter, yet it may bear such a relation to the national government
that Congress, by reason of its paramount authority, may exclude
the states from the free exercise of their concurrent right. But
where Congress in the latter case does not exercise its exclusive right
of taxation, the states are left free to exercise their concurrent
powers. The shares of national banks were thought to come in the
latter class and to be subject to state taxation: Srtetson v. City of
Bangor, 56 Maine 274. Some of the state courts, while recog-
nising the Act of 1864 as valid and enforcing its provisions, ques-
tion the authority of Congress to establish the national bank
system : Smith, County Treasurer, v. 1l'ebb, 11 Minnesota 500,
512.
In December 1865, the first case requiring a construction of
this Act of 1864, arose out of the statute of New York, in which
it was enacted " that shares in the national banks should be in-
eluded in the valuation of personal property of any person or body
corporate, in the assessment of taxes in the town or ward where
the bank is located and not elsewhere," but contained no provi-
sion that the tax imposed should not exceed the rate imposed
upon the shares of banks organized under state authority. The
act was held void because there was n tax laid on the shares of
state banks at all, although there was a tax on the capital of such
banks: IFan Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573. For an able dis-
cussion of this subject see City qf Utica v. Churchill, 33 N Y.
161. It was claimed by the counsel of the national banks, and
the position sustained by a minority of the court, that so much of
the capital of the national banks as was invested in United States
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bonds was not liable to taxation, on the principle of the case of The
Ban / of Commerce v. Ne'w York. It was an actual, though indirect,
taxation of the bonds, and it was doubted whether Congress had
power, without express reservation in the loan acts, to authorize
such taxation. And it was attempted to be shown that Congress
did not intend to authorize the taxation of the shares of these
banks without reference to the amount of capital invested in national
securities: Ibid. CHASE, J.; 589. But this view was repudi-
ated by the majority, upon plain and well-known -principles of
law. Large and important privileges were granted to the cor-
porators of these banks, and the tax imposed by the government of
the United States, and allowed to be imposed by the states, were
burdens imposed as conditions of the grant of the charters; the tax
was on the francise, not upon the bonds. And should the view be
deemed even plausible, that it was a tax on the bonds, then it was
a tax on the new use and new privilege conferred upon the holders
of these bonds, a tax annexed as a condition to the enjoyment of
this new use and new application of the bonds. Further, the bonds
are owned by the corporation, a distinct person from the share-
holders; the latter are interested in the property of the bank, but
they are not the owners of it, they are entitled to participate in
the profits of the bank earned in the employment of its capital
during its existence, in proportion to the number of shares held;
and upon its dissolution, to their proportion of its property that
may remain after payment of its debts ; it is this interest whick
the states may tax and not the capital of the bank: Ibid.
NELSON, J., 582-84. It is to be observed, in connection with
this opinion of the minority of the court, that in the leading
case on this subject (McCulloch v. Maryland), where the Bank of
the United States was a public corporation, created for public
and national purposes, it was conceded that the shares of the stock-
holders were subject to taxation by the state; that they were pro-
perly subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Soon after this deci-
sion, in April 1866, New York passed another act, taxing shares
of the national banks as other personal property, in the place where
located, with this proviso: "But not at a greater rate than is
assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals
in this state." At the December Term 1866 of the Supreme Court
of the United States, this act was held to be in conformity to the
Act ot Congress, and valid. Three of the judges dissented upon the
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same ground taken in the previous case : People v. The Oommis-
sioners, 4 Wall. 244; People v. The Commissioners of Taxes, 85
N. Y. 423. Where a state imposes a tax on the capital of
state banks, the shares in the hands of the stockholders being
exempt, a law imposing a tax on the shares held in natioi-al banks
violates the Act of Congress of 1864 and is void: Bradley v. Peo-
ple, 4 Wall. 459.
The state of Kentucky passed a law imposing a tax on bank
stock or stock in any moneyed corporation of loan. or discount, of
fifty cents on each share thereof, equal to one hundred dollars,
and directed that the cashier of bak whose stock is taxed should,
on the first day in July of each year, pay into the treasury of the
state the amount of tax due on the shares of the bank; imposing
a penalty on cashier and his sureties for a failure to comply
with the law. This is a tax on the shares of the stockholders and
not upon the capital of the bank. The circumstance that the tax is
collected through the officers of the bank does not alter the char-
acter of the tax. It is a common mode of collecting such taxes. Tile
officer of the bank is made the tax collector of the state. National
Ban / v. Commomwealth, 9 Wall. 353. People v. Bradley, 39 Ill.
130, and 11c Veigh v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 318, support the doctrine that
shares of national banks may be taxed by the states: s. P. S7mit I,
Co. Treas., v. Webb, 11 Minn. 500. The doctrine of the exemp-
tion of the instrumentalities of the Federal government from tax-
ation by the states, and its limitation, of which this case is an ex-
ample, is well stated by MILLER, J.: "The doctrine has its
foundation in the proposition, that the right of taxation may be so
used by the states as to destroy the instrumentalities by which the
government proposes to effect its lawful purposes in the states.
. .. . The limitation is, that the agencies of the Federal gov-
ernment are only exempted from state legislation so far as that
legislation may interfere with or impair their efficiency in per-
forming the functions by which they are designed to serve that
government. Any other rule would convert a principle founded
alone in the necessity of securing to the government of the United
States the means of exercising its legitimate powers, into an un-
authorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the states :"
MILLnr, J., 9 Wall. 361-62.
Where a state imposes a tax on the shares of a national bank,
at the same rate as state banks, with the exception of two banks, as
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to which it had previously disabled itself by a contract from taxing
beyond a certain amount, the rate upon the national banks being
at a rate higher than these latter banks, is not a violation of the
Act of 1864. That act only requires the states to tax as far as it
has capacity the shares of national banks in like manner as banks
of its own creation: Lionerger v. Rowse, 9 Wall. 468. So where
there is a tax on shares of national banks at the same rate as other
moneyed capital, but some moneyed capital in the county wher6
the bank is located is exempt from taxation, the tax is valid :
BEveritt's Appeal, 71 Penna. St. 216. The principle has been applied
to cases where there is a tax upon shares of national banks and no
tax upon shares of state banks, eo nomine, and the tax imposed on
the state banks is a full equivalent for that imposed on the shares
of the national banks, as a tax of three-quarters of one per cent.
on the amount of the capital stock of state banks, regardless of the
fact that a portion of its capital is invested in United States seeu:
ritics, or has been lost in business : Vran Slyke v. State, 23 Wise.
655; Bagnall v. State, 25 Id. 112; but where the tax imposed on
the capital, profits and time deposits of state banks, is subject to
a deduction for real estate and United States bonds, it is not re-
garded as an equivalent for that imposed on the national banks:
Frazer et al. v. Seibeon et al., 16 Ohio N. S. 614. Although the
tax is in form upon the capital of the bank, that is, is regulated by
the amount of the capital, if there be no deductions, and the same
rate of tax is required, the burden, on the stockholders or on the.
shares is the same; but if there are deductions, then the tax on the
state banks is diminished, and to that extent the rate is higher on
the shares of the national banks.
The National Banking Act requires the shares to be taxed "at
the place where the bank is located and not elsewhere." The courts
of Maine and other states hold that the place contemplated is the
town or district in which the bank was situated : Pacead V.
Lewiston, 55 Maine 456 ; Abbott v. Bangor, 56 Id. 310; s. P.
Stratham v. fflandeville, 33 Ind. 111 ; People v. The Commis-
sioners of Taxes, 35 N. Y. 423-438; others that the place intended
was the state, and that the state, in exercising the right of taxing
the shares, might assess them at the residence of the owner or at
the town in which the bank was located: Austin v. Aldermen of
Boston, 14 Allen 359; Clapp v. Burlington, 42 Vt. 579. In
1868 Oongress gave a legislative construction to the Act of 1864,
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by amending that act and declaring that the words, "the place
where the bank is located and not elsewhere," shall be construed to
mean, "the state within which the bank is located :" 15 Stat. at
Large 34. This act abolishes the rule as to shares in national
-banks, that personal property of an intangible character follows
the person for the purposes of taxation, and gives it a situs of its
own, to wit, that of the state in which the bank is located, and such
state may tax these shares whether the owners are residents or
non-residents of the state: Providence Inst. for Savings J, JTewell
v. Git4 of Boston, 101 Mass. 575 ; Tappan v. A~erchants' Nat.
Bank, 19 Wall. 491. The case last cited from Massachusetts
speaks of this act as giving to national bank shares-to some extent
the character and fixity of real estate, and the latter is authority
for the position that such shares may be assessed in the town in
which the bank is located, whether the owners are residents of the
town or reside in some other part of the state, or are non-residents
of the state. But it is submitted that it is also true that resi-
dents of the state may still be assessed at their residence when it
is different from the location of the bank. A statute contemplat-
ing such an assessment has been held valid: Austin v. The Alder-
,men, 7 Wall. 695; but in that case the residence of the party
assessed and the location of the bank were the same, and the court
refused to express any opinion as to the validity of such an act,
if the residence and location were different.
(b) Other Instrumentalities.-The states cannot tax an officer
of the United States for his office, nor tax the emoluments of the
office. The officers of the government are necessary in its adminis-
tration ; if they can be interfered with in any manner by the states,
the government would not be supreme : Dobbins v. Commissioners
of Brie, 16 Pet. 435 (Cond. U. S. 370). But an officer of the
United States army residing in Philadelphia, although without
any domiciliary intention, is liable to be taxed for his household
furniture, or other personal property: Fin ey v. City of Philadel-
phia, 32 Penna. St. 381. So an enlisted soldier, possessed of real
and personal property situated in the town in which he is stationed,
is liable to be taxed for such property, although lie is not liable to
taxation by reason of his being stationed there as a soldier. And
as to the tax for which lie is liable, lie may be. arrested for non-
payment under the laws of the state: Webster v. Seymour, 8 Vt.
135. Massachusetts imposed a tax on the income from "any
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profession, trade or employment.". A clerk in a post-office, who was
appointed hy the deputy postmaster, and whose appointment was
approved by the postmaster-general, was assessed upon his income,
which included his salary as such clerk. It was held, that this
did not come within the rule of Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie;
that was a tax upon the office, this on the income, and the clerk
was made liable for the tax : Afelher v. Citj of Boston, 9 Mete.
73. It is difficult to see the force of this distinction. A clerk is
as necessary in carrying on the operations of the postal depart-
ment of the government as the p6stmasters themselves, and. a tax
on the emoluments of the clerk, although in form a tax on income,
is as much a burden upon one of the instrumentalities of the
government as a tax on the income of the postmaster himself, and
void to the extent that the emoluments of his office constitute that
income.
The forts, arsenals, dockyards, mints, post-offices, custom-houses,
or any other public property of the United States, are not liable to
state taxation, coming within description of instrumentalities of the
government, necessary to the exercise of the power vested in it:
Const. U. S., art. 1, § 8, par. 17. The public domain is not
liable to taxation by the states. When the government parts with
the title under the land laws, it becomes liable to taxation in the
hands of the purchaser. The contract of purchase is complete
when the certificate of entry is executed and delivered ; thereafter
the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and is liable to -
taxation by the states: Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 450 ; WIrither-
spoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210. Land as such in the occupancy
of a pre-emptor, whose right to purchase has not been determined
in his favor, is not subject to taxation until it has been paid for.
Up to that time, it is only a proffer to a certain class of persons
that they may become purchasers. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal.
645; Grand Gulf Railroad& B. Co. v.B ryan, 8 Smedes &MN.268.
Parker v. Winsen, 5 Kansas 362, seems to be contra, but this was
under a treaty with ITudians, providing " none of such lands shall
be subject to taxation until patents are issued therefor." But
where occupants of public lands of the United States, whether a
pre-emptor or one without license, has placed improvements on-
them, they are liable to assessment and taxation, if made so by
express statute of the state: People v. Shebrer, 30 Cal. 645. This
species of property, whose existence is recognised in many of the
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western states, as capable of being bought, sold, and taken in
execution, is thus described by SAWYR , J, "These possessions
are recognised as a species of property subsisting in the hands of
the citizen. It is not the land itself, nor the title to the land, nor
is it the identical estate held by the United States. It is not the
pre-emption right, but it is the possession and valuable use of
the land, subsisting in the citizen." The pre-emption right is thus
described in another state : "Strictly speaking it is not an estate
within any definition known to the common law. It is not an
interest in the legal title; but only a right of occupancy for the
time being, with a privilege of purchasing at some future period,
at a stipulated price. It is treated as property in this state, taken
and sold on execution, passes to an assignee in bankruptcy and
may pass by deed or other transfer: -Delaney v. Barn ett, 4
Gilm. (Ill.) 454, 492; Pierson v. David, 1 Iowa 23; Bush v.
Marshall, 6 How. 291; Thredgill v. Pintard, 12 How. 36. So
the possessory right in a mining claim is subject to taxation, and
not within the express exemption of the act admitting California
into the Union, "that the state shall never lay any tax or assess-
ment of any description whatever upon the public domain :" State
v. lfoore, 12 Cal. 56; affirmed in People v. Prisbie, 31 Id. 146;
People v. Cohen, 31 Id. 210; People v. Black -Diamond Co., 37
Id. 54.
The title to all land in this country is in the states, subject
to the right of occupancy of the Indians, who have no right to sell
or dispose of it, except by the consent of the state in which it is
located. The state has the privilege of purchasing fiom the
Indians. The lands occupied by the Indians are not subject to
taxation by the state, but where there is a treaty by which the
Indian title is extinguished, and which provides for their removal
beyond the Mississippi within the period at which the purchaser
at a tax sale would be entitled to possession, the lands are subject
to taxation: Fellows v. Deniston, 23 N. Y. 420. Nor are these
lands subject to taxation for the special purpose of surveying them
and opening roads through them, although the Indians, with the
consent of the United States, have agreed to sell to private indi-
viduals and to give possession within a certain period, it is only
after the lapse of such period that they are taxable: The NZew York
Indians, 5 Wall. 761. Nor is the principle affected by the fact
that the primitive habits and customs of the tribe, when in a say-
